In this article, we will have a look at history and data to better understand the impact of AAA in reality. The next part will enter the details of DCS’ units.
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A Bit of History
Shooting solid objects from the ground has been the primary form of air defence since before the dawn of aviation, when opposing forces did their best to down each other’s observation balloons.
Fast-forward to the second decade of the 1900, the Italian aeroplanes of what will become the “Regia Aeronautica” were the first to be used in a role akin to modern bombers. In 1912, an Italian aeroplane was also the first assessed victim of ground fire. However, throwing pans and slippers and hoping for the best was not particularly efficient. Ad hoc tools were needed, either brand new or existing weapons repurposed. They helped to ensure that, despite the dooming prophecies of Giulio Douhet, bombers, and aircraft in general, did *not* “always get through”.
The First World War saw the refinement of the aeroplane as a tool of war. To answer the new threat, along with aircraft specialisation, the folks on the ground realised that they required more range and firepower. The easiest way to do it was to point a field gun a bit upwards. For example, the Brits started by using various calibres, such as the 13- and 18-pounder, but they had little to no organisation at the beginning of the war. By the end of the conflict, instead, the British had their first formal anti-aircraft command.
The Second World War, triggered by the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, and joined soon after by their Soviet pals, brought a stunning series of advancements. Innovating from the basic fuzes of the Great War, World War II saw the introduction of science-fiction technologies for the time, such as radar-assisted guns and proximity fuzes. Even more impressively, the number of guns moved from a few hundred, to the thousands.
By September 1939 Germany had the largest air defence system in the world with over 6,700 light and 2,600 heavy flak guns. Compared to this, the U.K. had only 540 heavy anti-aircraft guns at this stage.
Even more impressive is the continuous expansion of the German flakartillerie that, by June 1944, fielded 10,900 heavy and 22,000 light guns deployed on the Western Front.
The end of the Second World War and the following conflicts saw continuous advances in technology. The Soviets, for example, introduced 14.5mm, 57mm, and 100mm guns, and reorganised the gun battery structure. Those changes reverberated onto the next conflict: the Korean War. At this point in history, anti-aircraft artillery units were the only means of somewhat effectively defending from hostile aircraft from the ground.
Of the 1,041 combat-related losses of UN forces’ aircraft, 816 were shot down by AA guns and small arms while 147 were shot down in air combat, i.e. almost 80 per cent of combat losses were due to AAA and only 14 per cent were lost in air combat.
Technological innovation, however, does not stand still.
A New Contender: Surface-to-Air Missiles
The development of SAMs, acronym for surface-to-air missiles, began surprisingly early, but it was after the Second World War that the concept became efficient and deadly. The S-25 “Berkut”, known as “SA-1 Guild” in NATO, was one of the first in a long series of systems that marked the beginning of a technological and military shift, something that touched even the common people’s imagination.
The S-75 Dvina, known on these shores as “SA-2 Guideline”, further improved many aspects of the SA-1, creating a staple of the air defences of many Soviet-aligned countries. The first victim of the SA-2 was a Taiwanese Martin RB-57D, in October 1957.
The “SAM era” had begun. The next major conflict in the Orient brought to bear both anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles.
Of all the 2,255 aircraft combat losses, as per the USAF Operational Summary of November 1973, a total of 1,433 aircraft were lost to AAA while 110 were shot down by SAMs. Though the losses to SAMs are at times given as 205, the fact remains that almost 89 per cent of all losses in Vietnam were to AAA and less than 8 per cent to SAMs. In the case of rotary wings, all but nine of approximately 2,400 helicopters were lost to AAA. Only seven helicopters were shot down by SAMs, and two by MiGs.
Eventually, the SA-2 claimed circa 30% of the US aircraft losses of the war.
A New Paradigm
The introduction of surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-2, initially meant to engage high-flying reconnaissance aeroplanes and nuclear jet bombers, had a major doctrinal impact: to avoid missiles, aircraft moved lower and lower. Needless to say, this pushed them into the open arms of anti-aircraft artillery batteries.
A new defensive structure was also created: the IADS, the acronym for Integrated Air Defence System, adding even more resilience and redundancy to the air defence organisations.
On the SAM’s side, the SA-3 and the SA-6 were also introduced. The latter was extremely dangerous due to its mobility and performance, albeit at the cost of a shorter engagement range. As the Israelis proved in the late 60s and early 70s, static air defences were a threat relatively easy to manage, contrary to mobile units carefully laid in ambush.
During the Yom Kippur war, Egypt fielded an impressive array of defences in a relatively tiny area, including:
- 40x SA-2 batteries;
- 80x SA-3 batteries;
- 40x SA-6 batteries;
- 50x control centres;
- 180x radar sites;
- 400+ early warning, acquisition and fire control radars;
- Integrated network of visual observers.
This impressive system was capable of dealing with high and medium flying threats. The low-level gap was handled by another formidable collection of weapons:
- 800x ZSU-23 and ZU-23;
- 500x 57mm guns;
- Large number of 85mm and 100mm static installations;
- Hundreds of SA-7 MANPADS.
The SAM sites were assigned three to four ZSU-23-4 Schilka AA guns and detachments of the man-portable SA-7s. The Schilkas were located 200 to 300 metres from the SAM launchers with the Strela-2 positioned at a distance of about five to seven kilometres along the likely low-level approaches to the site.
Syria, despite not possessing the huge amount of air defences of the Egyptians, still fielded a potent force composed of:
- 32x SA-6 batteries;
- 12x-20x SA-2 and SA-3 batteries;
- 160x ZSU-23;
- 260x ZU-23;
- 300x 57mm guns;
- Hundreds of SA-7;
- Circa 100 radar systems.
Fast-forward a decade, Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, fielded one of the most vast and powerful armies in the world. At the beginning of the hostilities with Iran, the Iraqi air defences included circa 70 batteries of various Soviet SAMs, such as SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9 and SA-14. On top of that, 60 Roland SAM systems, coadjuvated by over 4,000 guns of various calibres.
The post-revolution Iranian forces relied on equipment from a multitude of countries, such as HAWK, Rapier and RBS-70 systems, along with SA-7 MANPADS and circa 1,800 guns.
Contrary to the previous examples, both Iran and Iraq, but the former in particular, lacked an integrated and extensive network of early warning and surveillance radars, thus partially hindering the efficiency of SAM batteries such as the HAWK.
Unfortunately, there are no accurate and detailed data about the effectiveness of the various anti-aircraft systems. However, sources indicate that guns, short-range systems and MANPADS were the most effective.
Of particular interest is the arrangement of the air defences of the Iraqi forces at the beginning and during the prelude to what later became Operation Desert Storm. Iraq had at its disposal a powerful IADS designed by the French Thomson-CSF. The problem with this system is its organisation and original purpose, being focused primarily on defending from threats from Iran and Israel and being capable of handling 20 to 40 hostile aircraft at the same time. Almost a drop in the ocean of the Coalition forces, whose forces from countries such as UK, US, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and more, counted over 2,250 aircraft.
The progress of the air campaign saw a shift from low-level to medium as the SAM threat was progressively neutralised. Therefore, AAA and MANPADS constituted the most efficacious threat of the opening days. Shortly after, with the Coalition aircraft cruising above their envelope, the losses drastically diminished. In fact, the first 5 days of the war accounted for 36% of the losses, with an average of 6.2 per day. The remaining 38 days saw a total of 55 additional losses, 1.45 per day on average. Of particular interest is the impact of radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, which fell from 29% to 9% of the caused losses.
Desert Storm was the last major conflict in which technologically semi-comparable forces faced each other, at least on paper. Thereafter, conflict became almost entirely asymmetric. Besides, in DCS, there are no sufficient modules to portray a symmetrical conflict in the 2010s.
Conclusions
The discussion so far should have made clearer the importance of AAA and MANPADS in real life. We can also already compare the composition of the air defences of various conflicts starting from the Second World War and notice how, in the vast majority of DCS servers, anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS are vastly underrepresented. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of defences are composed of SAMs, which are hard-countered by a combination of too-precise anti-radiation ordnance and poor AI. Things get more interesting with community-made IADS mods, but we are still far from the efficacy of any realistic system.
The mentioned issues and more make AAA and MANPADS almost redundant, whereas they should be a scary prospect, in conjunction with point defence fighters and non-suicidal SAMs. Unfortunately, once again, we are facing both DCS’ shortcomings and, perhaps, a bit of disinterest from the mission designers. What do you think?
FlyAndWire 